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1 Introduction
The 1997 Asian financial crisis represents a watershed
in East Asia’s economic history. The end of the East
Asian economic miracle has ushered in a long and
painful period of economic reform and restructuring. It
taught the crisis-hit countries a lesson that structural
weaknesses of the financial system exacerbate a crisis
when it occurs, though they may not necessarily
trigger it. Indeed the crises left little doubt that the
cumulative effect of financial imbalances could cause
serious disruptions to the economy and interfere with
real sector development. As part of their efforts to
build resilience to external shocks, most of the East
Asian countries including the crisis-hit ones have
voluntarily or under external pressure, increased the
pace and scope of domestic financial reform to
liberalise and open their financial markets and also to
improve soundness, corporate governance and risk
management at financial institutions.
The reform efforts have been complemented by an
accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves as
self-insurance and the last line of defence against
crises. Apparently these countries believe that
financial reform alone will not ensure financial
stability and safeguard against future crises. The 1997
financial turmoil has also served as a catalyst for
building a region wide defence system against future
crises as well as for deepening financial market and
monetary integration. This movement has culminated
in the institutionalisation of two regional initiatives:
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and Asian Bond
Market Development Initiative (ABMI).
Ten years have elapsed since the East Asian economies
embarked on economic restructuring and institutional
reform in 1997. The period may be long enough to
allow an evaluation of the effects of the overall
reform on efficiency and stability of the financial
system. Most of the studies on the Asian crisis divide
the causes of the crisis into three categories. The first
category consists mostly of misguided macroeconomic
policies that resulted in deterioration of the current
account, which in turn provoked large capital
outflows. They include the exchange rate policy that
kept the currencies overvalued, premature and
disorderly capital account liberalisation that induced a
massive increase in capital inflows during the first half
of the 1990s, much of which were speculative, and
loose monetary policy that set off and fuelled asset
inflation and bloating of real estate bubbles. The
second category of the causes comprises inefficiencies
and structural weaknesses of the financial sector.
Some of the vulnerabilities in this category were a
large overhang of loans for real estate financing,
currency and term mismatches in the balance sheets,
the absence of risk management, poor governance
and lack of transparency at financial institutions
including commercial banks. The third category refers
to institutional weaknesses in governance in such
dimensions as accountability, government
effectiveness, political stability, quality of regulatory
control, the rule of law and corruption as documented
by a series of studies by Kaufmann et al. (2006).
The purpose of this article is to analyse in terms of
statistical and other information available, whether
East Asia in general and the crisis-affected countries
in particular have been successful in improving
policies, institutions and governance. On the basis of
this evaluation, this study will assess whether and to
what extent these countries will be able to withstand
external shocks that may trigger a financial crisis.
Section 2 analyses potential macroeconomic
vulnerabilities that may increase the probability of
provoking a crisis. Section 3 is devoted to a review of
financial and institutional reform the crisis-affected
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countries have made and its contribution to financial
stability since the crisis. Section 4 highlights some of
the systemic risks that may destabilise financial markets
of some of East Asia’s emerging market economies
(EMs). Here we note the financial weaknesses of both
Indonesia and the Philippines as a potential source of
financial turbulence that can be contagious. The other
sources of financial distress are real asset inflation,
which appears to be accelerating in some parts of East
Asia and the fall of the US dollar. Section 5 examines
the rationale of holding large amounts of reserves as a
precautionary measure of warding off crises.
Conclusions are in the final section.
2 Macroeconomic vulnerabilities and crisis
prevention
The recovery of the crisis-affected countries was
much faster than expected and in comparison with
previous similar crises elsewhere. To some extent,
Indonesia was an exception. By the second-quarter
of 1998, stability had returned to financial and
foreign exchange markets, the current account
started registering a surplus and growth resumed.
The major factor that helped break these countries
out of a relatively short-lived recession was a surge
in exports induced by large currency depreciation.
Since then these countries have grown, on average,
more than 5 per cent per year, mostly on the back of
robust export expansion. Household consumption
has been stagnant. From mid-2005 through mid-
2006, investment spending actually fell in three of
those four-quarters in the Philippines, Thailand, and
Taiwan, and in two out of four-quarters in Indonesia.
With few exceptions, all macroeconomic indicators
are benign, as they mostly were when the crisis hit
nearly a decade ago. Except for Indonesia and the
Philippines, inflation is below 5 per cent, sometimes
much lower. Except in a mild way, Malaysia budget
balances are close to balance or in surplus and public
debts are low except in the Philippines. Price stability
is not just the result of conservative monetary and
fiscal policies; it reflects stability of both wage growth
and the prices of imported goods and services.
While the macroeconomic situation is generally
reassuring, there might exist some more subtle
vulnerabilities. The major source of growth continues
to be exports, which have been increasing at around
20 per cent annually since the crisis. Domestic
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Table 1 Current account surpluses of ten East Asian economies
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006p Cumulative to 2006
Japan 114.6 119.7 87.8 112.5 136.2 172.1 165.8 168.3 1076.9 
% of total 51.7 58.7 50.4 49.2 45.9 48.3 22.6 41.5 41.1 
% of GDP 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.9 
China 21.1 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 68.7 160.8 160.8 530.6 
9.5 10.1 10.0 15.5 15.5 19.3 22.0 39.6 20.3 
1.9 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.6 7.2 6.1 
Korea & Taiwan 32.9 21.2 26.3 31.0 41.2 46.7 32.6 24.0 255.9 
14.9 10.4 15.1 13.6 13.9 13.1 4.5 5.9 9.8 
4.5 2.5 3.4 3.7 4.5 4.7 2.9 1.9 
Hong Kong 25.1 18.9 24.2 28.1 43.5 43.6 353.6 20.2 557.2 
& Singapore 11.3 9.3 13.9 12.3 14.6 12.2 48.3 5.0 21.3 
10.3 7.3 9.6 11.2 17.4 16.0 119.9 6.3 
ASEAN 4 27.9 23.6 18.6 21.7 30.0 24.9 19.1 32.7 198.7 
12.6 11.6 10.7 9.5 10.1 7.0 2.6 8.1 7.6 
6.7 5.2 4.2 4.4 5.3 4.0 2.8 3.9 
Total 221.7 203.8 174.3 228.8 296.8 355.9 732.0 406.0 2619.2 
Source IMF Intenational Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook 2006 (IMF 2006d); The Economist
3 January 2007 for 2006 estimates.
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Figure 2a Real effective exchange rate. Monthly averages: 2,000=100
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Figure 2b Real effective exchange rate: ASEAN 4. Monthly averages: 2,000=100
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demand – business fixed investment in particular –
has been weak and its growth erratic. As the IMF
(2006c) puts it, there is continuing real investment
slump in East Asia. The ratio of investment to GDP,
which had been in the range of 30–45 per cent in
the crisis-affected countries before the crisis,
plunged to below 25 per cent on average, even
though the saving ratio has remained stable
(Figure 1). This divergence explains why current
account surpluses have remained positive and large
ever since the crisis, when they swung from large
deficits to equally large surpluses.
In 2003 and 2004, capital inflows into the region
increased sharply. Together with the current account
surpluses, this contributed to a surge in foreign
exchange reserves throughout East Asia, since most
countries allow for limited nominal exchange rate
flexibility. In fact, because of the implicit tie to the
declining US dollar, real effective exchange rates have
depreciated, with the notable exceptions of Korea
and Thailand (Figure 2).1
One important question is whether the export-led
growth process can be sustained. Since the crisis, the
share of exports in GDP has risen in all East Asian
EMs indicating growing dependence on external
demand for growth. Even for such a large economy
as China, the ratio is close to 40 per cent. It has
more than doubled in Thailand between 1997 and
2005, and increased very substantially in the other
countries, especially in Malaysia and Taiwan, during
the same period.
Before the crisis, export growth led to an
attendant increase in domestic consumption and
strong incentives for investment in the export-
oriented sector. This causal relation has broken
down since the crisis. When the domestic demand
is weak as it has been in East Asia’s EMs, export
promotion itself does not help sustain a high rate
of growth and employment unless it produces a
surplus on the current account. This feature
explains the policy of keeping the currency
undervalued. As discussed below in Section 4, this
heavy reliance on exports will render most EMs
highly vulnerable to the adjustments in global
imbalances that will take place eventually. In the
event of a substantial weakening of the US dollar
vis-à-vis East Asian currencies, compressed US
imports from the region would heighten the risk
of a deep recession.
So far, a continuing pressure towards exchange rate
appreciation has been met by foreign exchange
reserve accumulation. This can be costly. Although it
has not been so in countries like China (but see Yu
Yong Ding in this IDS Bulletin), the capacity of further
sterilisation has been very much exhausted in several
other countries. It is also raising tension with partner
countries outside the region. On the other hand, a
sharp appreciation could take the steam out of the
growth engine, with possibly wide-ranging
consequences. The response of most of the EMs has
been to deregulate capital outflows. Although capital
inflows in 2005 were as large as those of 2004, they
were balanced out by equally large capital outflows
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Table 2 Current account and capital inflows: emerging Asia (billions of US$)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Current account –28 29 119 113 88 91 128 168 187 255
Gross capital inflows 193 149 –121 100 191 65 81 191 346 345
FDI inflows 71 81 86 104 139 98 80 83 129 162
Portfolio bond inflows 28 18 –2 –4 –1 1 5 11 22 16
Portfolio equity inflows 18 7 1 95 76 25 10 68 55 88
Derivatives, bank borrowing, etc. 76 43 –205 –96 –24 –59 –14 29 140 79
Gross capital outflows
and errors and omissions –107 –164 59 –126 –216 –70 –59 –132 –107 –335
Reserves accumulation (–) –58 –15 –57 –87 –62 –86 –150 –227 –337 –265
Note Aggregate data of ten Asian economies: China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore,Taiwan province of China and Thailand.
Source IMF (2006d).
(Table 2). At this stage, therefore, the increase in
inflows is not likely to cause difficulty in managing
either the exchange rate or foreign exchange
reserve.
Given the large cushion of reserves, many analysts
believe that most East Asian countries can cope with
large capital outflows (but, see cautionary comments
in Yu Yong Ding, this IDS Bulletin). In fact, it appears
that they are now prepared to deregulate capital
outflows further, so as to prevent any strengthening
of their currencies. This leaves the export-led growth
strategy as one of the major macroeconomic
structural weaknesses of the region.
3 Growth, structural changes and stability of
the financial sector
3.1 Growth, liberalisation and structural changes
Between 1997 and 2005, except in the Philippines,
the size of the financial sector measured by total
financial assets as a proportion of the GDP on
average more than doubled in most countries
(Table 3). The growth of the banking sector has been
impressive, but it has been outstripped by the
phenomenal expansion of assets in both equity and
bond markets (Table 4).
The size of the equity market in Indonesia has more
than doubled. The increase has been more than
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Table 3 Financial assets (% of GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 148.50 168.71 186.14 204.02 234.24 255.54 267.68 224.4 205.3 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 519.30 611.70 454.20 476.3 450.5 
Korea 127.20 171.07 216.94 195.91 213.98 217.09 242.63 270.5 260.9 
Indonesia 72.80 75.05 115.71 70.42 64.17 63.37 67.55 66.1 98.3 
Malaysia 250.50 274.10 412.39 352.49 381.36 368.91 409.16 412.4 385.4 
Philippines 158.40 155.72 160.43 138.60 126.35 123.80 132.98 127.9 140.3 
Singapore 259.00 327.77 468.24 373.54 375.41 349.94 441.56 452.2 474.0 
Thailand 101.90 204.38 216.88 172.70 190.39 206.31 258.95 241.3 214.5 
Note Financial assets = sum of domestic bonds, equity market capitalisation, bank assets.
Source Ismail (2005), Ghosh (2006) for 2005 estimates; IMF (2006b) for Japan.
Table 4 Structure of financial systems (% of GDP)
Economy Bank asset Equity market capitalisation Bonds outstanding
1997 2004 2005 1997 2004 2005 1997 2004 2005
China 124.6 176.4 163.1 11.2 23.1 17.8 12.9 24.9 24.2
South Korea 37.9 130.1 93.5 8.1 57.1 91.2 25.2 83.3 76.2
Malyasia 100.9 169.09 159.4 93.2 153.3 138.0 57.0 90.0 88.0
Indonesia 31.1 14.6 49.8 12.2 28.9 28.9 1.9 22.6 19.6
Philippines 56.1 66.5 63.2 37.7 33.0 40.4 22.4 28.4 36.7
Thailand 79.7 129.2 103.6 15.1 71.4 70.1 7.1 40.7 40.8
Singapore 122.0 176.8 185.4 110.8 202.3 220.4 24.7 73.1 68.2
Source Ghosh (2006). IMF (2006b).
tenfold in Korea and almost fivefold in Thailand. Only
the Philippines has seen a modest expansion of its
equity market. The growth of assets in the bond
market, albeit starting from a low base, has been
faster than that of the equity market in all East Asian
economies. Nevertheless, except for China, the size of
the bond market is still much smaller than that of the
equity market.2 Except for China and Indonesia, by
2005, the size of the combined assets of both equity
and bond markets became larger than that of the
banking sector. East Asia’s financial system no longer
appears to be dominated by the banking sector.
Although they are now much more market-
oriented, the financial systems are not yet fully
liberalised. Liberalisation has been characterised by
the lack of agreement on the scope and speed of
reform among domestic constituents and marked by
relapses and backslidings in many countries in the
region. Capital account liberalisation, arguably the
last stage of financial reform, has moved at a snail’s
pace. Chinn and Ito (2006) show that most of the
East Asian emerging economies have made little
progress in financial market opening in recent years.3
Aside from the domestic politics, the official
conventional wisdom on financial opening has shifted
in response to ambiguous evidence about its effects
on growth and financial stability. As Kose et al. (2006)
note, emerging economies need to cross several
thresholds before they open up their financial
markets: deeper domestic financial markets, better-
run companies and a disciplined macroeconomic
policy. On these criteria, few of East Asia’s emerging
economies are ready to fully open their financial
markets. In addition, the huge build-up of foreign
exchange reserves has given East Asia’s policymakers
a sense of protection and may make them
complacent about addressing their financial fragilities.
3.2 Financial stability
The Asian financial markets have been widely blamed
for the crisis: they had built up large, short positions
in foreign currencies; they had lent without adequate
caution and they had disregarded standard prudential
norms, it was said. In many respects, they have been
thoroughly reformed since the crisis, but in some
countries, reforms are far from complete. In addition,
further regional financial integration may well
become an added conduit for crisis contagion.
Official data indicates that the percentage of non-
performing loans has declined substantially since the
crisis (Table 5) and that various prudential ratios are
above BIS norms, even though they vary a great deal
from country to country, with the exception of the
Philippines, where there has been a recent decline.
Goldstein and Turner (2004) report that currency
mismatch among financial institutions – the villain of
the crisis – has declined throughout Asia, with the
exception of the Philippines. They also note that
‘increases in reserves not only serve to reduce
[currency mismatch], but also offer an opportunity
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Table 5 Bank non-performing loans to total loans (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Japan 5.4 5.8 6.1 8.4 7.2 5.2 2.9 1.8 n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.8 25.6 20.1 15.6 10.5 9.8 
Hong Kong 5.3 7.2 6.1 6.5 5.0 3.9 2.3 1.5 1.3 
Korea 7.4 8.3 6.6 3.4 2.4 2.6 1.9 1.2 1.2 
Singapore n.a. 5.3 3.4 8.0 7.7 6.7 5.0 3.8 3.8 
Indonesia 48.6 32.9 18.8 31.9 24.0 19.4 14.2 15.6 n.a.
Philippines 12.4 14.6 16.6 27.7 26.5 26.1 24.7 20.0 n.a.
Malaysia 18.6 16.6 15.4 17.8 15.8 13.9 11.8 9.9 9.5 
Thailand 42.9 38.6 17.7 11.5 16.5 13.5 11.8 11.1 8.9 
Source IMF (2006b).
to deepen domestic debt market’ (Goldstein and
Turner 2004: 117).4
The opaqueness of corporate governance and
looseness and unreliability of financial disclosure at
East Asian banks were the other factors claimed to
have triggered and deepened the Asian crisis. The
crisis-hit countries have since then sought to introduce
and enforce international standards on the legal and
regulatory requirements on information disclosure,
shareholder and creditor rights and accounting and
auditing standards. Despite these reform efforts,
although the available evidence is rather sketchy, it
appears that they have not made much progress in
governance reform. The World Competitive Yearbook
shows that there has been little improvement in the
transparency of financial institutions. In fact it
deteriorated in China, Taiwan and the Philippines,
whereas other countries managed a modicum of
improvement between 1999 and 2005 (Table 6). The
combination of inadequate disclosure rules – more
widely limited transparency of the corporate sector –
and of large foreign holdings of equities suggests that
the equity markets could be quite sensitive to internal
and external shocks, possibly the epicentre where
financial market turbulences emanate.
In most countries, as the result of consolidation, the
average size of banks has increased and foreign
ownership has taken hold. Controls over asset and
liability management of the banking sector have
been removed so that banks are now freer to
conduct business in securities and insurance. This
should enhance efficiency. Noting that evidence to
that effect is lacking, Ghosh (2006) suggests it might
be too early to reap the gains from consolidation. At
this stage, the main result of the consolidation is a
domination of banking by a small number of large
banks, which may have undermined competition. As
for the efficiency of equity markets in the region,
the markets of Hong Kong and Singapore fare
relatively well but not those of China, Indonesia, the
Philippines and Thailand, which belong to the
bottom quartile of efficiency ranking.
Ghosh (2006) finds that the scope of disclosure by
the top five banks in East Asia’s EMs is relatively
broad. Among the crisis-affected countries, Korea
and Malaysia, followed by Thailand, have made the
most progress in reforming their laws and
regulations and practices but these and other EMs in
the region have a long distance to travel in
protecting minority shareholder rights, in improving
the quality of financial reporting and disclosure and
in enforcing the rules and regulations. China has only
recently begun to strengthen its corporate
governance.
The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (2006a)
notes weaknesses in some countries’ regulatory
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Table 6 Financial institutions’ transparency (2000–6)
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Japan 3.32 4.52 4.22 3.44 3.85 4.44 4.63 5.38 
China 4.99 4.60 3.36 3.60 4.18 3.98 3.22 4.78 
Hong Kong 7.09 6.92 7.24 7.57 7.39 7.41 7.39 7.78 
Taiwan 5.67 6.03 5.90 5.58 5.67 5.75 6.07 5.38 
Korea 3.39 4.29 4.59 5.05 4.37 5.21 6.00 5.14 
Singapore 7.16 7.67 7.10 7.53 7.46 7.67 7.24 7.15 
Malaysia 5.88 6.29 3.65 5.89 6.35 6.94 5.85 6.72 
Indonesia 3.37 4.54 4.53 3.48 3.61 4.54 4.39 4.95 
Philippines 5.82 5.83 5.21 4.73 4.61 4.56 5.19 5.63 
Thailand 3.93 5.04 4.55 5.52 5.69 5.93 6.10 6.48 
Note measured on the basis of information provided by financial institutions about their activities.
Source IMD (2006).
capacity and legal infrastructure. Since the crisis, re-
vamping and consolidating the system of prudential
control of financial markets and institutions has been
one of the focal points of the reform agenda
throughout East Asia. Unfortunately there are few
studies that can shed light on qualitative improvement
of the regulatory control system.5 According to
Kaufmann et al. (2006), the quality of the overall
regulatory control has deteriorated in China,
Indonesia and the Philippines, and remained roughly
at the same level in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
between 1998 and 2005. Only Korea registered a
substantial improvement during the same period.
Several studies show that the two regional
cooperative initiatives embodied in the CMI and
ABMI together with financial market opening have
increased the linkages among East Asia’s financial
markets over the past seven years.6 They also present
empirical evidence that East Asia’s bond and equity
markets have become more closely integrated with
those markets of advanced economies in Europe and
North America than those of East Asia.
This development is corroborated by an increase in
correlations of equity returns across countries in East
Asia, though the correlations among bond returns
are much smaller (Ghosh 2006). Park and Song
(2001) show that during the Asian crisis, Korea
would have had a better chance of fending off the
crisis had the Thai crisis been contained within its
borders. By the time of the hit, Korea’s financial
markets had not established extensive linkages with
the markets of other East Asian economies. The
increasingly closer financial linkages between
countries therefore mean that financial market
disruptions in one country could easily spill over into
neighbouring economies, including those with a
strong and sound financial system with a higher
speed and intensity than before.
4 Potential vulnerabilities in East Asia
The first line of defence against financial crisis is built
around a macroeconomic policy regime in which
financial prices including the exchange rate are
flexible enough to deflect or absorb adverse external
shocks. In so far as they are fixated on export
promotion, policymakers of East Asia’s EMs may not
be able to hold the first line of defence. Building a
resilient financial system that can withstand financial
distress constitutes the second line of defence. The
preceding review of recent assessments of financial
stability does not provide a clear picture as to
whether the crisis-affected countries have succeeded
in fortifying this line of defence.
The third and final line of defence is to accumulate
foreign exchange reserves enough to deter any
attack on their currency and to prepare for sudden
and massive capital outflows. Given the cracks in the
first and second lines of defence, it is not surprising
that East Asia’s EMs have been driven to buttressing
the last line of defence.
The review of stability of the financial system in East
Asia points to three potential sources of vulnerability
in East Asia. One such source is a crisis either in
Indonesia or the Philippines that can be contagious.
The two other sources are real asset inflation that
may set off a boom–bust cycle and a large
depreciation of the US dollar that may precipitate a
severe recession. They can reinforce each other to
unleash a wave of financial market turbulences
throughout East Asia. The epicentres of these
financial woes are likely to be located in China and
more advanced countries in the region.
4.1 The Indonesian and the Philippines factor
Fitch Rating (2005) has developed two banking
stability indicators. The banking system indicator (BSI)
is a measure of intrinsic bank systemic risk on a scale
from A (very high quality) to E (very low quality)
based on an explicit assessment of the strength of
banks standing alone. Another measure is the
macroprudential indicator (MPI) with a rating from
one to three. The MPI focuses on the coincidence of
the trend levels of private sector credit, bubbles in
real asset prices, and major currency appreciation,
which gives early warning of a common type of
banking system stress.
The two indicators suggest that banks in the countries
analysed in this IDS Bulletin may not be out of the
danger zone. In terms of the BSI, Korea and Malaysia
receive a C, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan
and Thailand a D, and China and Vietnam an E rating.
As far as the macro-prudential indicators are
concerned, they do much better with the MPI 1 rating.
The discussion in the preceding sections also
suggests that Indonesia and the Philippines are most
vulnerable to both internal and external shocks. On
the macroeconomic front, the two economies suffer
from the highest rates of inflation in East Asia. The
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size of their government debt may not be
sustainable. Although they have been generating a
current account surplus, it is shrinking. After three
years of sustained depreciation that improved the
competitive edge of their exports, their real effective
exchange rates have been appreciating since the
third-quarter of 2005. Short-term foreign debt as a
percentage of foreign reserves rose to more that
100 per cent in Indonesia in 2006, making it a likely
target of a speculative attack. The ratio has been
lower in the Philippines, but at almost 40 per cent, it
may be too high to keep speculators at bay.
Changes in many of the financial stability and
governance indicators also cast doubt as to the
soundness and resilience of their financial systems. In
the Philippines, non-performing loans have been on
average more that 25 per cent of total loans of banks,
which is the highest in the region, since 2001.
Indonesia has been successful in removing bad loans at
banks, but the non-performing loan ratio at more
than 15 per cent is still too high to be out of the
danger zone of crisis. To make matters worse,
Indonesia’s provisions for bad loans are hardly adequate
and so is its bank regulatory capital to assets.
Very worrisome is that banks in the Philippines are
exposed to a high degree of currency mismatch in
their balance sheet, in fact twice as high as the
degree of Korea at the time of the crisis in 1997.
If a crisis erupted in either country, would it be
contagious? The majority view is that contagion will
not be as pervasive as it was during the 1997–8 crisis.
It is said that regional as well global investors have
now access to better information about local
economics and politics and that they have become
much more sophisticated in assessing risks. It is
therefore argued that they have become selective
and discriminating in investing in East Asia as shown
by the divergent movements in the spreads
(JP Morgan EMBI + Index). All of this suggests a
lower probability for a crisis in one country to create
panic among or trigger herding of investors to cause
massive capital outflows in other healthier
economies. However, past experience shows that
crisis behaviour is essentially unpredictable.
4.2 Asset inflation and real estate market bubble
Having experienced the boom–bust real estate
market cycle in the run-up to the 1997 crisis, East
Asian countries cannot take lightly rising asset and
housing prices. Some countries – China, Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand – all have seen substantial
increases in housing prices over the last few years
(Table 7). In China and Korea, there are bubbles in the
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Table 7a House price changes (% change on year
ago)
End-2003 End-2004 End-2005
Korea 5.7 -2.1 7.5 
Malaysia 4.0 4.8 2.4 
Thailand 17.8 9.3 7.2 
Source IMF (2006).
Table 7b House price indices (% change on year ago)
Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q3 2005 Q3 2006 Latest (as of Dec. 2006)
Hong Kong 23.4 28.7 14.1 20.3 –2.1 
China 5.1 10.8 6.6 5.5 5.4 
Singapore –2.0 0.9 3.3 3.3 7.6 
Japan –5.7 –6.0 –4.7 –5.4 –2.7 
Source The Economist, 7 December 2006, 8 December 2005 and 3 March 2005.
making in real estate markets. It is difficult to judge
whether this evolution could trigger a crisis as it did
before. Looking at the likely causes may help clarify
the situation.
Relatively easy monetary policy and abundant global
liquidity have driven interest rates down to historic
lows, boosting the demand for housing and other types
of real estate. As is often the case, as the prices of real
estate started rising, it has generated an expectation
that they will continue to rise, thereby fuelling a boom.
As shown in the preceding section, bank assets and
equities as a percentage of the GDP recorded
almost a threefold increase in Korea between 1997
and 2005. They more than doubled in Thailand, and
jumped up by 109 percentage points in Malaysia
during the same period. China has recorded a more
modest increase of about 77 percentage points. The
markets for bank assets and equities in these
economies tend to be very liquid, and there is the
danger that any change in price expectations of real
estate could unleash a massive shift of funds to and
from the real estate markets, thereby amplifying the
boom–bust cycle.
The major shift in bank lending to households from
businesses is also playing a role in house price
inflation. The slump in investment throughout the
region has curtailed the business demand for bank
loans. Unable to find creditworthy corporate
borrowers, banks and other non-bank financial
intermediaries have aggressively sought to increase
their loans to households, the bulk of which have
been mortgage loans. As shown by the recent data
compiled by the IMF (2006c) and the World Bank
(2006), household credit has grown across eight
emerging economies in East Asia.7 It was on average
close to 28 per cent of GDP at the end of 2005 as
compared with 12 and 9 per cent in emerging
Europe and Latin America, respectively (Figure 3).
The ratio is certainly less than half of the level of
advanced economies, but the rapidity with which it
has grown in East Asia is quite dramatic. The average
growth rate of 22.6 per cent of real household
credit for the eight countries was more than twice
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Figure 3 Household credit, end 2005 (% of GDP)
Source IMF (2006c).
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Figure 4 Annual growth of real household credit (% of GDP)
Figure 5 FED tightening and EM spreads
Source Blejer (2007).
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the rates of mature economies and Latin America
during the 2000–5 period (Figure 4). The bulk of
household loans was extended for housing finance to
raise the share of housing loans in total household
credit to more than 54.2 per cent compared with
around 35 per cent8 in 2000.
Measured in market values, housing markets are
large compared with other asset markets. For
example, the total value of apartment units alone
was more than twice the size of nominal GDP at
the end of 2005 in Korea. The housing market tends
to be volatile because on the demand side, housing
has become more like a tradable asset due to low
transaction costs and high market liquidity, while the
supply is rather unresponsive to its price changes in
the short run.
What would happen if the boom comes to an end?
If the current trend continues, the familiar scenario
of the boom–bust cycle could well unfold. Rising
asset prices encourage further credit growth by
raising collateral values, so that an eventual decline in
inflated property prices may result in a slowdown of
the economy. When the interest rates rise or growth
decelerates, household balance sheets come under
pressure and a sudden stop in the housing market
boom piles up non-performing loans at banks and
other financial institutions. The risk is enhanced in
the absence of adequate risk management and
prudential regulatory infrastructure.
The end of the boom can then be followed by a
decline in consumption and construction investment,
as happened during the Asian crisis. How damaging
could the collapse of the housing market be? As
discussed below, a large depreciation of the dollar, if it
occurs, is likely to cause a large currency appreciation
and a severe recession throughout East Asia. The
recession could well end the housing boom and also
bring about a collapse of the equity market.9 Support
for this view is provided by the co-movement
between equity and housing prices in Hong Kong,
Korea and Singapore, which suggests that the wealth
effect dominates the substitution effect associated
with price changes of the two assets (see Shu 2006).
The end of the boom itself is unlikely to be as
damaging as it was during the 1997–8 crisis but the
ensuing decline in equity and real estate prices could
cause large capital outflows, possibly even touching
off a major crisis, as it did before. An optimistic view
Figure 6 Risk premia for emerging markets
Source Blejer (2006).
is that, given that short-term foreign loans account
for a much lower share of total foreign debt, the
outflows might not deplete the ample reserves,
especially if the authorities are prepared to let the
exchange rate depreciate in response to the outflows.
We return to these two assumptions below.
4.3 Export-led development strategy and the
collapse of the dollar10
The current account deficit of the USA surpassed 6 per
cent of GDP in 2006. There is a widespread consensus
that such a large deficit, which is the major source of
imbalance between the USA and East Asia, cannot be
sustained. Despite the potential convergence of
interest, the key players on both sides of the Pacific –
China, Japan and the USA – have not taken any
coordinated policy responses that would signal their
intention to resolve the imbalance. This inaction may
lead markets to conclude that the main players are
unable to agree on the direction of needed policy
changes and hence increase the risk of a market-led
adjustment that will involve abrupt and excessive
changes in major exchange rates and asset prices,
triggering a global recession and aggravation in trade
frictions. Recent studies suggest that the effective
exchange rate depreciation of the dollar required to
reduce the US current account deficit to 3 per cent of
the GDP in the medium term ranges from 15 to 20
per cent (see Baily 2007). A sharp depreciation of the
dollar, accompanied by a sudden compression of the
US current account deficit, could then provoke a deep
recession in East Asia, as the region heavily depends on
exports for growth, the bulk of which is destined for
the US market. Whether this slowdown could sow the
seeds of another financial crisis is not clear.
The previous episodes of financial crisis imply that
the dollar depreciation would raise US interest rates
and lower US Treasury prices, which could in turn
precipitate a flight to quality by investors in advanced
countries that leads to sudden stops in capital inflows
and heightens volatility in emerging financial
markets.11 The curtailment of capital flows toward
the USA would then lead to higher US Treasury
benchmarks and wider emerging-market bond
spreads, especially for borrowers with high ratios of
debt to GDP. This time around, the emphasis on the
impact on financial markets of a fall in the dollar is
likely to be ambiguous, more so in East Asia.
This ambiguity stems from the observation that the
positive correlation between US interest rates and
emerging market spreads, a key assumption in this
analysis, is less pronounced and less stable than
suggested by the scenario. For a number of countries
and periods this correlation has been essentially non-
existent (Eichengreen and Mody 1998). As shown in
Figures 5 and 6, emerging market spreads have been
declining while the US interest rate has been rising.
If the higher US rates are caused by sudden
evaporation of the willingness of foreign investors to
finance the country’s current account deficit and
from the inflationary effects of the consequent fall in
the dollar, then they will be accompanied by lower
interest rates in the rest of the world. With less
liquidity flowing to the USA, more liquidity will
remain in other markets.12 If the dollar falls, foreign
interest rates must be lower than US rates by the
amount of expected foreign currency appreciation in
order to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. And if
higher interest rates in the USA are accompanied by
lower rates in Europe, then it is not obvious that
emerging markets will be adversely affected.
For emerging markets to feel a strong negative
impact, one must add another element that
produces a significant drop in global liquidity, for
example a sharp adjustment of US asset prices that
produces distress, or at least fears of distress, among
financial institutions, as happened in the bond
market correction of 1994 and the LTCM (Long-Term
Capital Management) crisis of 1998. Such fears could
result in de-leveraging by foreign as well as US
financial institutions, reducing global liquidity. They
could produce a global flight to quality and, in
particular, less appetite for emerging market debt, as
happened in these earlier periods.
But East Asia has greatly reduced its dependence on
new foreign borrowing. As a group, the East Asian
countries are running current account surpluses; they
have no need for additional foreign debt. In fact, they
have been reducing net external debt by accumulating
reserves. It is true that if the US current account
abruptly moves to balance, current accounts in Asia
and Latin America will have to move to balance as
well, assuming that Europe’s current account balance
remains where it is, at zero. When debt is maturing it
will have to be rolled over or paid back, but the
amount of debt to roll over is very small in East Asia:
excluding Indonesia, at the end of 2005, short-term
foreign debt including those long-term obligations
maturing within a year range from 17.6 per cent in
Malaysia to 40 per cent in the Philippines of reserves.
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This means that in the unlikely event where all
funding suddenly becomes unavailable, East Asian
countries could still retire their maturing obligations
and meet their other external financial needs without
depleting their reserves.
While East Asia’s countries seem reasonably well
insulated from the distress caused by a dollar
depreciation transmitted through the financial
channel (even though sources of financial distress
may arise from unexpected channels), this does not
mean that they are immune to a fall in the dollar. On
the contrary, they will suffer severely through the
trade channel. The elimination of foreign financing
for the US current account would force its net
imports to decline by some 7 per cent of US GDP.
Since it would take time for a dollar depreciation to
crowd in additional US exports, it is reasonable to
assume that the entire swing comes in the form of
falling US imports.
As a first approximation, assume also that the dollar
falls by the same amount against all foreign
currencies, reducing US imports across the board.
The impact on various regions depends on the
importance of exports to the USA as a share of
regional GDP. In 2005, this share varied. For the
larger East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) and China,
they would be relatively high, up to 15 per cent.13
Thus a disorderly correction of the US current
account imbalance should have the largest impact on
emerging markets most dependent on exports to
the USA, which means above all, the small entrepot
economies of East Asia (such as Hong Kong or
Singapore). Looking at the issue comparatively, East
Asia is more vulnerable than Latin America, mainly
because the Asian region is more open and closely
linked to the USA.
A less sanguine view allows for a significant
slowdown in the USA and a more modest
slowdown in China induced by the appreciation of
the renminbi to differentially impact commodity
exporting countries. For example, if demand growth
in the USA and China and therefore demand growth
globally were to slow, the terms of trade of
commodity exporters like Indonesia would be hit.
Conversely, developing countries that depend on
commodity imports, which means mainly the
resource-poor East Asian countries, will experience
weaker commodity prices as a partial cushion against
slower global growth.
In sum, the principal risk to stability in East Asia from
the current pattern of global imbalances lies in the
possibility of a disorderly correction that would
precipitate a major slowdown in US growth and a
significant rise in US interest rates. But in contrast to
the experience of the Asian crisis, the risk to East
Asia would not lie this time in the financial
consequences. These countries are running current
account surpluses rather than deficits, minimising
their borrowing.14 And as pointed out in the previous
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Table 8 Foreign exchange reserves (millions of US$)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*
China 165574.0 212165.0 286407.0 403251.0 609932.0 818872.0 987900.0 
Malaysia 27432.2 28632.9 32419.1 42772.4 64905.9 69376.9 79300.0
Indonesia 28280.4 27047.5 30754.3 34742.4 34724.1 32774.2 38400.0 
Philippines 12974.8 13352.7 13200.5 13523.3 12979.5 15800.1 19500.0 
Singapore 79685.2 74850.7 81366.5 94974.9 111498.0 115334.0 135300.0 
Korea 95855.1 102487.0 120811.0 154509.0 198175.0 209968.0 229500.0 
Thailand 31933.2 32349.5 38042.2 40965.1 48497.5 50502.0 60700.0 
Total 441734.9 490885.3 603000.6 784738.1 1080712.0 1312627.2 1550600.0 
* Excluding gold, except Singapore and China, IMF definition.
Source IMF, The Economist (16–22 December 2006).
section, there are not many internal imbalances or
glaring structural weaknesses, certainly not as many
as before. This is not to imply that the exceptionally
low level to which emerging market spreads have
fallen will be sustained. But ample international
reserves could help countries to compensate for a
flight to quality and adverse shifts in the price and
direction of international capital flows.
At present, the main risk stems from the possibility of
a significant slowdown in US growth and, more
specifically, in the growth of US net import demand.
The incidence of the effect varies with trade
openness and more specifically with dependence on
exports to the USA. In Asia, exposure to the danger
of a disorderly correction is greatest for countries like
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which are highly
open and export heavily to the USA. In addition, the
impact will tend to vary with the policy response, not
just with the extent to which currencies are allowed
to move but with macroeconomic policy generally.
5 Reserve accumulation as self insurance and
precautionary demand
At the end of 2006, the seven East Asian countries
– ASEANS plus China and Korea held a total of more
than US$1.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves
(Table 8). As a proportion of the GDP, reserve
holdings ranged from 100 per cent in Singapore to
11 per cent in Indonesia. Short-term foreign debts as
a percentage of total reserves have also declined
markedly in all countries since 1997. Except for
Indonesia, the reserve holdings are often seen as
excessive. It is argued that this is a wasteful use of
precious resources, which could be better used in
building private and public productive capital. It is
further argued that the accumulation of reserves is
the other side of the coin of an aggressive export-
led development strategy based on the systematic
undervaluation of exchange rates.
5.1 Are international reserves excessive?
A first issue is whether these reserves are really
excessive. This requires agreeing on how to measure
them. Discussions about international reserves
usually start with a figure like the left chart in
Figure 7, which is spectacular, but whose implications
are far from obvious. The usual procedure is to scale
the reserves by measures such as GDP, exports or
imports. When this is done, the impression that
reserves were abruptly built up starting in the late
1990s remains, which has led many observers to
conclude that this accumulation has been excessive.
Implicitly, this assessment assumes that reserves
should grow with the size of the economy as
measured by GDP or with the size of external trade.
It is very unclear what lies behind the view that GDP
is an appropriate scaling variable. As for trade, the
usual justification is that countries need to have
enough reserves to meet unexpected disturbances,
with sufficient means to avoid a sudden stop in
essential imports. Indeed, it used to be that
international institutions recommended that reserves
represent at least three-months worth of imports.
Such a recommendation draws the attention to two
features. The first one is the idea that reserves
constitute a form of insurance against unexpected
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Figure 7 International reserves
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disruption. The second one is the implicit view that
either the trade balance is where balance-of-
payment disturbances mostly occur, or that the main
risk to be insured by reserves concerns the financing
of recurrent trade deficits.
The prevalence of the trade balance as the main
source of unexpected disturbances may be an
acceptable assumption for low-income developing
countries that are characterised by export
specialisation in a narrow range of staple goods, often
raw materials. This assumption does not apply to
emerging market countries characterised by well-
diversified exports. Obviously, emerging market
countries are unlikely to face a situation where export
earnings may decline abruptly to the point that they
can no longer pay for imports, essential or not.
The main source of uncertainty for emerging market
countries lies in the capital account, not the trade
balances. The Asian crisis is a clear case in point. For
these countries, therefore, the proper scale variable
is neither GDP nor exports but some measure of
exposure to sudden capital outflows. Which
measure? One possible measure, directly inspired by
the Asian crisis is external debt. For example, the
Greenspan–Guidotti–Fischer rule recommends that
reserves be at least equal to short-term debt. The
chart on the right in Figure 7 shows how different
things look when external liabilities – irrespective of
maturity – are used to deflate reserves. Although
reserves as a ratio to external liabilities have grown in
recent years, there is hardly any historical standard to
brand them as excessive. However, if reserves were
compared with short-term debt, there would be an
increase in the ratio, showing an important
strengthening of defences.
The contrast between the two charts further shows
that countries which become financially integrated
face radically changed reserve needs. Some Asian
countries have gone far in responding to these needs.
For example, China’s reserve accumulation has picked
up speed recently and the case of Korea is similar. 
5.2 Good and bad reasons for reserve accumulation
As noted before, one good reason for holding reserves
is to insure the country against sharp and sudden
reversals in the balance of payments. Emerging market
countries should focus on their capital account. A
second reason is what Aisenman and Lee (2006) call
‘mercantilism’. The Asian countries’ export-led growth
strategy is sometimes seen as a case of mercantilism.
Which reason applies and how to evaluate the motives
has recently become the object of investigation.
The importance of self-insurance has been
documented by Lee (2004) and Aisenman and Lee
(2007). They conclude that self insurance in the
presence of the risks of systemic sudden stops,
defined as periods of skyrocketing aggregate bond
spreads and large capital flow reversals is the main
reason for reserve accumulation. Using a calibrated
theoretical model, Jeanne and Rancière (2006) reach
similar conclusions. They provide convincing evidence
that the self-insurance motivation explains much of
the recent reserve build-up. Yet they note that,
according to their model, Asia’s accumulation may be
excessive.
In fact, many Asian countries do not conceal that
they take a rather stringent view of self-insurance.
Their intention is to rule out the need to apply to
the IMF for emergency loans as they did in 1997–8.
Then and now, they consider that the conditionality
attached to these loans was ill-designed and violated
their sovereignty. The rejection by Malaysia of these
conditions, and the controversial evidence by Kaplan
and Rodrik (2001) that Malaysia fared at least as well
as the other countries, is seen as an example to be
followed should a new crisis erupt. Fear of the IMF,
therefore, may explain why Asian countries are
‘buying’ more self-insurance than other countries.
The alternative explanation to self-insurance is
mercantilism. The prime suspect in this game is China
which, as noted above, stands apart for its rapid
reserve build-up. Is there a plausible alternative
explanation? One possibility is the state of its
banking sector. China may well have larger than usual
needs for reserves to face a potential banking crisis.
It is not known how large the net foreign currency
liabilities of Chinese banks are. If they are large, the
authorities may have to promptly intervene in case
of stress. If this intervention triggers a currency crisis,
the authorities need to have yet more reserves to
stabilise the exchange rate.
Whatever the true motives behind reserve
accumulation may be, it is clear that many East Asian
policymakers are not persuaded that the reforms of
their financial, corporate and public sectors, together
with a range of institutional reform, are sufficient to
rule out future crises. It remains to be seen whether
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the stocks of accumulated reserves are large enough
to fend off currency attacks mounted by determined
speculators.
5.3 What is the problem with large reserves?
The standard argument against large reserve stocks is
that they are costly to the country that holds them.
Obviously, returns on high-grade liquid assets are low,
not just in comparison with other assets but, it is
claimed, also with the returns from domestic
productive investment. Comparing costs and returns on
foreign assets, Rodrik (2006) puts the cost at 1 per cent
of GDP when reserves amount to 30 per cent of GDP.
Other estimates give different results; sometimes they
even find that the costs can be negative.
Most estimates of reserve costs assume that
domestic investment provides a higher social return
than liquid foreign asset holdings. This assumption,
however, is questionable. Holding foreign reserves
may represent a very decent use of emerging market
country savings. The Lucas paradox – the fact that
capital tends to flow from developing to developed
countries – has shown that returns from investments
in many developing countries may be very low, if not
negative. A further reason to question the view that
returns from international reserves are comparatively
low is related to possible limits to domestic
investment. With a savings rate close to 50 per cent
of GDP, China faces a serious absorption capacity
hurdle. It is reasonable to assume that there exist
physical limits as to how much new investment,
inclusive of public investment, can be carried out.
China probably must invest some of its savings
abroad. It could do better than acquiring low-yield
bonds but there too, as has been shown recently,
the willingness to allow for a build-up of Chinese
ownership of private stocks is not unbounded. More
generally, coupled with a high saving rate, the
investment slump described above suggests that
many East Asian countries have no choice but to
acquire foreign assets.
As we know from finance principles, comparing
returns is not enough to decide the proper share of
assets in any portfolio. In addition, holding a large
stock of reserves does not mean that the assets must
be held in just one form. Indeed, some countries
(Korea, for example) actively manage their portfolios.
Leaving aside the asset allocation issue, the potential
opportunity cost of assets must be related to
potential benefits. If the main purpose is export-led
growth, the potential benefits can be very large. Of
course, currency undervaluation imposes an additional
cost to trading partners, but the cost-benefit balance
may be favourable for the country in question if there
exist fixed costs, market distortions or increasing
returns. There seems to be no study that attempts to
measure the existence and extent of such benefits,
and further research may be required.
If the main purpose is self-insurance, some cost of
holding reserves can be justified again. But what
exactly is the risk that is insured and how is it
covered? Currency crises can be very expensive,
especially when they are accompanied by banking
crises, as is often the case. Estimates of these costs
range from 10 to 25 per cent of GDP, sometimes
even more and these estimates overlook the social
and political costs of severe crises (see also the
Introduction to this IDS Bulletin). Assuming that
reserves of, say, 100 per cent of GDP are apt to
provide the sought-after protection, an assertion that
is challenged below, the Rodrik estimate implies an
annual cost of about 3 per cent of GDP. Further
assuming that crises costing 25 per cent of GDP may
arise once in a decade, even ignoring discounting, the
insured expected risk is of the order of 2.5 per cent
of GDP. This would suggest that self-insurance via
foreign exchange reserves is not particularly attractive.
Of course, we would need to add the non-economic
costs of financial crises – social pain and instability,
political turmoil, wealth redistribution and more –
especially impact on increased poverty, as well as the
possible long-term loss of economic dynamism.
The matter becomes even more complicated once
we allow for moral hazard. As discussed above, there
are many ways for a country to reduce the odds of a
crisis and to make its consequences less dramatic.
The experience of the developed countries suggests
that both the odds and the consequences can be
considerably reduced by adopting adequate structural
and macroeconomic policies. Self-insurance becomes
excessively expensive if a large stock of reserves acts
as a disincentive to adopt these policies, especially
since most of them carry additional favourable
supply-side benefits.
The second issue concerns the question of what self-
insurance really achieves. Foreign exchange reserves
are not really an insurance mechanism: they do not
pay back a fraction of the costs, they are only meant
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to reduce the odds of a crisis. The deep question,
then, is whether they offer an iron-clad protection.
There is no consensus on this question, for lack of
empirical investigation. In theory, there is little doubt
that large reserves may deter crises, but there is no
guarantee that the deterrent is always effective. Even
if reserves meet the Greenspan–Guidotti–Fischer rule
and are equal to short-term debt that may not be
enough once we allow for short positions (via
derivatives) and capital flight. Jeanne and Wyplosz
(2003) show that determined markets can quickly
build up virtually unlimited speculative positions.
The main role of reserves is therefore to prevent
reaching a situation where the markets are
sufficiently determined to challenge the authorities’
willingness to commit their reserves. In doing so, the
authorities must be willing to take on serious losses.
More importantly, perhaps, they must be able to
sterilise massive interventions, which mean seriously
re-shaping the balance sheets of domestic
commercial banks and corporations. Indeed, consider
commercial banks that sell foreign currency forward
to domestic and international speculators. The
central bank may need to stand ready to provide
these institutions with the foreign currency that they
will have to deliver and, at the same time, extend
domestic currency credit to keep the money supply
unchanged. When the banking sector is relatively
fragile, large-scale sterilisation may become a
hazardous undertaking. Replacing a currency crisis
with a domestic financial crisis is not particularly
appealing.15
In the end, the conclusion is far from clear-cut. On
the one hand, the costs of large foreign exchange
reserves may be significantly less than is commonly
assumed. On the other hand, the self-insurance value
of large reserve stockpiles may be exaggerated.
While Asian countries may be getting a decent
return from their high foreign exchange reserves,
they may harbour a mistaken sense of immunity from
financial crisis.
5.4 The regional dimension
Assuming that reserves are excessive and that the
accumulation is partly, at least, explained by the
export-led growth strategy, it remains to be seen
how East Asian countries can respond. The export-
led growth strategy implies a desire to hold down
the real appreciation that accompanies economic
catch-up. The main reason for giving up the strategy
is that it has a strong beggar-thy-neighbour flavour –
but who are the neighbours?
A first class of neighbours includes the rest of the
world. This is where the export-led growth strategy
is often strongly criticised. A cooperative approach
requires that all Asian currencies be allowed to
appreciate in real terms vis-à-vis the currencies of
the developed countries. The solution favoured by
the developed countries and the IMF is exchange
rate flexibility. The assumption behind this option is
that market forces will drive each country’s real
exchange rate to its equilibrium level, and will keep it
appreciating as long as catch-up unfolds. If things
were that simple, this would be the ideal solution.
This solution may not be as ideal as its proponents
expect it to be. In the absence of foreign exchange
market interventions, the balance of payments would
be balanced and reserves would not be accumulated
any more. If financial integration deepens, as gross
foreign-currency liabilities expand, the authorities
might want to keep reserves growing, which would
not be possible anymore. The answer is that when
the exchange rate floats, the needs for reserves
greatly diminish. This may be so, but central banks still
must assume the lender of last resort function, which
may require large stocks of reserves if the financial
institutions hold large amounts of liquid foreign-
currency liabilities. Furthermore, even if the currency
floats freely, current account surpluses could still
occur because of the high saving rates that prevail in
East Asian countries.
Of course, the idea that floating exchange rates keep
the real rate close to its equilibrium level is strongly
contradicted by the facts. Floating exchange rates are
highly volatile and this volatility is now known to be
fairly disruptive to trade flows. For countries that
view exports as a growth driver, this is a very
unappealing prospect. A particular concern is the
second class of neighbours, namely the regional
trading partners. Given the depth of regional trade
integration, bilateral exchange rates are a major
concern.16 If random fluctuations vis-à-vis the major
currencies translates into random fluctuations of
bilateral exchange rates, the reluctance of Asian
countries to let their currencies freely float becomes
understandable.
This observation suggests yet another interpretation
of reserve accumulation. Assuming that all Asian
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countries conclude that it is in their collective
interest to stop accumulating reserves and to allow
for exchange rate flexibility, they would each stand to
benefit from coordinating the policy move. Absent
of any agreement, the natural outcome is to wait for
the others to move first. Indeed, moving first implies
taking the risk of seeing one’s exchange rate
appreciate vis-à-vis all other currencies, both
regionally and beyond. Thus, it is conceivable that the
lack of any agreement – despite some progress
following CMI and ABMI – acts as a stumbling block.
6 Conclusions
Since the crisis, most East Asian countries have
achieved much progress in making their financial
systems less crisis-prone and more crisis-resilient.
They have also continued to conduct prudent
macroeconomic policies. And they have accumulated
impressive stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves. A
key motivation behind these momentous efforts is a
shared desire to avoid being caught again in a
financial crisis. Has this objective been achieved?
We argue that the risks have been considerably
reduced but, unsurprisingly perhaps, that they have
not been eliminated. Financial systems are a lot safer
but there is no such thing as a perfectly safe financial
system. Large amounts of foreign exchange reserves
may deter some speculative attacks, but they may be
overrun by well-determined speculators. In addition,
progress has been uneven from country to country.
As a result, weak spots survive and regional
contagion remains a threat, albeit a distant one. The
natural question is what else can and should be done
to further reduce the odds of financial crises.
Park and Wyplosz Emerging Economies in East Asia: Are they Safe from Future Crises?26
Notes
1 In the case of Japan, large capital outflows have
been the cause of the yen depreciation.
2 Ghosh (2006) shows that in terms of the size of
the bond market relative to the per capita income,
East Asia lags behind other emerging economies
elsewhere, such as Latin America. Furthermore,
much of the growth has come from the increase
in government bond financing for the acquisition
of non-performing loans at insolvent financial
institutions as part of the crisis resolution. Partly
for this reason, the corporate bond market is
much smaller than the government bond market.
One of the major constraints on the growth of
the bond market has been the limited liquidity in
the secondary markets.
3 In contrast, however, Ghosh (2006), using the IMF
data, provides a totally different picture that
‘Regulation prohibiting or restricting capital
inflows and outflows have been progressively
reduced, and, except in China, they are now fairly
minimal’ (2006: 37).
4 Goldstein and Turner (2004) also point out that
better macroeconomic and exchange rate policies,
developing domestic bond markets, and improving
efficiency of financial oversight are critical to
limiting the degree of currency mismatch. Not
many East Asia’s EMs, it seems, have taken these
precautionary measures seriously.
5 According to the GSFR, EM policymakers need to
develop a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework and infrastructure for better
assessment of systemic risk and their mitigation.
6 See Eichengreen and Park (2006), Kim et al. (2005),
Shin and Yang (2006) and Jeon and Yang (2005).
7 They are: Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea,
Indonesia, India, China and the Philippines.
8 An estimate.
9 Shu (2006) shows that an appreciation of the
dollar exchange rates is associated with housing
booms and vice versa, in particular in countries
that adopt flexible exchange rates.
10 This section draws on Eichengreen and Park (2006).
11 See the World Bank (2006).
12 This is an implication of the interest parity
condition.
13 Oil exporters also rely heavily on the USA for
their final market, but they are a special case.
14 As noted above, even if the current account is in
surplus, the current account minus debt
amortisations can still be a negative number,
rendering them dependent on capital flows. And
a current account surplus only eliminates a
country’s dependence on capital inflows; it will be
less than comforting if a country experiences
large capital outflows.
15 Capital controls may reduce the size of the
undertaking.
16 The importance of this observation for exchange
rate arrangements is examined in greater detail in
Park and Wyplosz (2004).
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